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CASE COMMENTS
INFANTs-EQurrABLE PEOCEDURE FOR DEo
ING CUSTODY OF A NEGLECTED CBm=.-Petitioners

uNG AND ORDER-

filed joint petition

in circuit court of Doddridge County seeking a decree changing
the custody of Delbert Hammond, a four year old child neglected
by his parents, from the Department of Public Assistance to them.
The child, formerly in custody of petitioners under agreement with
the department, had been removed from petitioners' home by the
department because of petitioners' refusal to submit the boy to a
tonsillectomy, which was never subsequently performed and presumedly not needed anyway. The child had since been moved and
removed from home to home continuously. Petitioners alleged a
pending and undetermined petition by themselves in another
circuit court for permission to adopt the child, and presented evidence that they are qualified and are willing and anxious to provide a suitable and permanent home for him. The department
opposed the petition on the grounds first, that the circuit court of
Doddridge County has no jurisdiction over custody of the child,
contending that habeas corpus on the law side is the only proper
proceeding to recover custody of a child, and second, that persons
who have received custody of a child under contract with the
department are not eligible for adoption of such child. The
circuit court awarded custody to petitioners. On the department's
appeal, held, first, that, having acquired original jurisdiction over
the child in a proceeding to declare the boy a neglected child, the
circuit court of Doddridge County, then sitting as a juvenile court,
has continuing jurisdiction over him; second, that the withdrawal
of the child from petitioners' custody terminated their contract,
making petitioners eligible to adopt the child, and that since the
decree of the court protected and conserved the welfare of the
child, it was proper. Affirmed. Hammond v. Dep't of Public Assistance, 95 S.E.2d 845 (W. Va. 1956).
The basic principle underlying the decision of this case is so
well settled in the West Virginia law that it can be called a maxim.
The principle has been stated in varying forms, but the rule has
never varied. The leading case on the point is Green v. Campbell,
85 W. Va. 698, 14 S.E. 212 (1891), in which Judge Holt said at
page 702, "the welfare of the infant is the polar star by which the
court is to be guided in the exercise of its discretion." This doctrine
has continued to guide the actions of West Virginia courts in
custody cases. Dep't of Public Assistance v. Pettrey, 92 S.E.2d
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917, 921 (W. Va. 1956); Lipscomb v. Joplin, 131 W. Va. 302, 47
S.E.2d 221 (1948); Pukas v. Pukas, 129 W. Va. 765, 42 S.E.2d 11
(1947). Where the welfare of the child demanded it, the court has
subordinated all other ordinarily applicable principles.
The department contended in the principal case that the circuit
court of Doddridge County did not have jurisdiction over the
custody of the child. The boy was originally declared to be a
neglected child and was given into the custody of the department
by decree of the Doddridge County court; and by the unequivocal
language of W. VA. CODE c. 49, art. 5, § 2 (Michie 1955), once
jurisdiction has been obtained by any competent court in the case
of any child, such child shall continue under the jurisdiction of
such court until he becomes twenty-one years of age unless discharged by such court.
As to the proper proceeding to determine the custody of a child,
the writ of habeas corpus ad subficiendum or a suit in equity may
be used. Law and equity have concurrent jurisdiction in the matter.
Stout v. Massie, 88 S.E.2d 51 (W. Va. 1955); Annot., 14 A.L.R.
295, 808 (1921); 48 C.J.S., Infants § 5 (1945); 27 Am. Jxu., Infants
§ 105 (1940).
The department's contention in the principal case that the
petitioners were not eligible for adoption of the child was based
purely on the previously existing contract between the department
and the petitioners by the terms of which petitioners agreed that
they would not, while acting under the contract, be eligible for
adoption of the child. This provision ceased to exist when the
contract ceased to exist, and the court held that the contract was
terminated by the department's action in removing the child from
petitioners' custody. This position is undoubtedly correct. Cf. Realty
Securities Corp. v. Johnson, 93 Fla. 46, 111 So. 532 (1927); Gessler
v. Erwin Co., 182 Wis. 315, 193 N.W. 368 (1928).
Considering the principles applicable to such cases, as set out
above, the court arrived at a just and equitable result.
There is, however, an important question of natural justice
suggested by this case. What is the wisdom of the department's
prerogative to make foster parents ineligible for adoption? In the
writer's point of view, such a rule violates all rules of natural justice,
and should be declared void as contrary to public policy. Al the
wisdom of humanity speaks against such an inhuman rule. To
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preclude by contract the power of the court to allow adoption
by foster parents, people who are in a position to know and love
the child and for the child to know and love them, does not seem
to square with the avowed policy of promoting the child's welfare.
If in the future this clause comes in issue in this state, it is
hoped that the court will, with sound judgment, declare it to be
void as against public policy.
G. W. H., Jr.
RiEsmnucVE CovmqN rs-iGwT TO COMPENSATION iN EmIm T
DomAN PROCEMInnG.-Relators alleged that their lot and all the
other lots of a subdivision were subject to restrictive covenants
binding the lot owners to use their lots exclusively for residential
purposes. D, a municipal corporation, began a proceeding to condemn an adjoining lot. The adjoining lot owner conveyed the
lot to D before the condemnation proceeding was completed. D
constructed a toll bridge on the adjoining lot. Relators instituted
a mandamus proceeding in a circuit court to compel D to prosecute
an action in eminent domain to ascertain just compensation owing
to them. A peremptory writ was awarded as prayed for. The
Supreme Court of Appeals granted a writ of error. Held, that the
restrictive covenants should not be so construed or applied as to
require the government or one of its agencies, in the taking or
acquiring of private property for a governmental use, to respond
in damages either on the theory of a taking of a vested right or for
breach of such a covenant. Reversed. State ex rel. Wells v. City of
Dunbar, 95 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1956).
It should be noted at the outset that the court expressly stated
that "the holding does not determine the question as it relates to a
public service corporation, that question not being here involved".
Id. at 461. The decision therefore applies only to the government
or a governmental agency, and not to public service corporations
which have the power of eminent domain.
Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V; W. VA. CONST. art. III,
§ 9. The basic question in the principal case (assuming that the
building of a toll bridge would be a violation of the restrictive
covenants) is whether relators, by virtue of the building restrictions,
are entitled to compensation from D, a governmental body, which
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